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ABSTRACT 
 
Stepping Stones for the Unemployed: The Effect of 
Temporary Jobs on the Duration until Regular Work∗ 
 
Individual labour market transitions from unemployment into temporary work are often 
succeeded by a transition from temporary into regular work. We investigate whether 
temporary work increases the transition rate to regular work. In that case, temporary work 
may enhance labour market efficiency. We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to 
estimate a multi-state duration model, applying the ‘timing of events’ approach. To deal with 
selectivity, the model incorporates transitions from unemployment to temporary jobs and 
unobserved determinants of the transition rates. The data contain multiple spells in labour 
market states at the individual level. We analyse the results using novel graphical 
representations. The results unambiguously show that temporary jobs serve as stepping 
stones towards regular employment. They shorten the duration of unemployment and they 
substantially increase the fraction of unemployed workers who have regular work within a few 
years after entry into unemployment, as compared to a situation without temporary jobs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In many countries, the labour market has displayed an increase in flexible jobs in general, 
and in temporary jobs in particular. There is an extensive debate on the extent to which such 
jobs improve welfare in general and help individual workers in particular. It is often argued 
that the existence of temporary work is especially beneficial to currently unemployed 
workers, because it provides them opportunities to gain work experience and acquire human 
capital, to deepen the attachment to the labour market, and to search more effectively for 
more desirable jobs. Temporary job experience may be informative about the ability and 
motivation of the individual (screening or signalling). Some studies show that employers 
indeed use atypical contracts as a way of screening for permanent jobs (e.g. Storrie, 2002; 
Houseman et al., 2003). In this paper we examine the extent to which temporary work 
facilitates individual unemployed workers to move from unemployment to regular work, that 
is, the extent to which temporary work acts as a stepping-stone towards regular work. 
Our empirical analysis follows the ‘timing of events’ approach formalised by Abbring 
and Van den Berg (2003). We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to estimate a multi-
state duration model. The model specifies the transition rates from unemployment to 
temporary jobs, from temporary jobs to regular work, and from unemployment directly to 
regular work. Each transition rate is allowed to depend on observed and unobserved 
explanatory variables as well as on the elapsed time spent in the current state. To deal with 
selection effects, we allow the unobserved determinants to be dependent across transition 
rates. For example, if more motivated individuals have less trouble finding permanent jobs 
but are also over-represented among those in temporary jobs, then a casual observer who 
does not take this into account may conclude that there is a positive causal effect even if in 
reality there is none.1 We also exploit subjective responses on whether the individual desires 
to have a regular job. We exploit the multi-spell nature of the data to reduce the dependence 
of the results on functional form specifications. The ‘timing of events’ approach exploits 
variation in observed moments of transitions in order to empirically distinguish between 
causal effects and selection effects. Somewhat informally, if a transition to a temporary job is 
often quickly succeeded by a transition into a regular job, for any constellation of 
                                                          
1 Purcell et al. (1999), Feldman et al. (2001) and Von Hippel et al. (1997) have found low levels of motivation 
among temporary workers. 
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explanatory variables, then this is strong evidence of a causal effect.2 Here we adopt the 
specific model framework developed by Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours (2002), for two 
reasons. First, it allows in a natural way for ‘lock-in’ effects of temporary jobs, meaning that 
they may involve a temporary standstill of search activities for other jobs. Secondly, it allows 
for heterogeneous treatment effects, meaning that the effect of having a temporary job on the 
transition rate to regular work may vary across observed and unobserved individual 
characteristics. Because of lock-in effects and effect heterogeneity, the parameter estimates 
are hard to interpret. We contribute to the methodological literature by analysing this in some 
detail and by developing a graphical procedure to express the main results.  
The estimation results also shed light on whether the individuals with a high 
incidence and/or duration of unemployment flow into temporary work more often, and 
whether they benefit more from a stepping-stone effect of temporary work. More in general, 
we address whether individuals who benefit from temporary work also have a high transition 
rate into temporary work. This is of importance from a policy point of view. If certain types 
of individuals barely flow into temporary work although their average duration until regular 
work would be substantially reduced by it, then it may be sensible to stimulate the use of 
temporary work among this group, for example by helping individuals to register at 
temporary work agencies.  
We abstract from effects of the existence of temporary jobs on the transition rate from 
unemployment directly into regular work (i.e. without intervening temporary work spell). It 
can be argued that this effect is negative if a temporary job facilitates a move to a regular job 
and if unemployed individuals are aware of this. However, the data do not allow for 
identification of this effect. We also abstract from equilibrium effects. Temporary contracts 
imply lower layoff costs and therefore stimulate employment creation (see for example 
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1994; Booth, 1997; Hoffmann and 
Walwei, 1999). Furthermore, the economic performance of firms may improve if there is less 
need to hoard workers as an insurance against a sudden upswing in demand (Pacelli, 2002; 
Kahn, 2000, Von Hippel et al., 1997). The use of temporary workers may reduce cyclical 
                                                          
2 The approach does not require exclusion restrictions, instrumental variables, or conditional independence 
assumptions. Recently, a number of studies have appeared in which the ‘timing of events’ approach is applied 
to analyze the effects of dynamically assigned treatments on duration outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 
2004, for an overview). 
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swings in labour productivity, since firms might be better able to shed workers quickly 
during a downturn (Estevão and Lach, 1999).  
To the extent that the data allow us, we also examine how job characteristics of 
regular jobs depend on whether they were directly preceded by a spell of unemployment or 
whether there was an intermediate spell of temporary work (see also Booth et al., 2002; 
Houseman, 2001).3  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data set, discusses some 
variables that we use in the analyses, and provides descriptives. Section 3 presents the model. 
The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
We use the OSA labour supply panel, which is a longitudinal dataset collected by the Dutch 
Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). This dataset follows a random sample of Dutch 
households over time since 1985, by way of biannual face-to-face interviews. The survey 
concentrates on individuals who are between 16 and 64 years of age, and who are not full-
time students. Therefore only households with at least one person in this category are 
included. All individuals in the household who fall under this category - head of the 
household, partner, children and other household members - are interviewed. This results in 
some 4000 individuals per wave. All households that cooperate in a wave are asked to 
participate again two years later except if all household members became over 65 years of 
age. An attempt is made to locate family (members) who moved. If household members 
refuse to participate then the other members are surveyed anyway. If the whole household 
refuses, a replacement household is approached. A replacement household matches the 
refusing one by sex, age, family size and region. We use data from 1988 to 2000. The 1988 
wave consists of 4464 individuals. In 1998, a quarter of them is still in the panel. In 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 refreshment samples were drawn, so that in 2000 the 
sample size was 4185. Van den Berg and Lindeboom (1998) and Van den Berg, Lindeboom 
                                                          
3 We are unable to check whether temporary work is associated with lack of training opportunities, as suggested 
by Farber (1997, 1999), Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and Amuedo-Dorantes (2002). 
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and Ridder (1994) study the effect of attrition in the OSA data on the estimates of the 
transition rates between unemployment and employment and between jobs. They find that 
although attrition is sometimes sizeable, it does not have discernible effects on the estimates 
of these rates. These two studies also provide ample background information on the data as 
well as references to other studies using these data. 
In the OSA panel, an effort is made to collect extensive information on the labour 
market histories of the individual respondents. Individuals are asked about their labour 
market status two years ago - the previous interview date - about all transitions made since 
then, and about the current labour market status. For every transition we observe when it 
happened, why it happened, by which channel the new position was found and what the 
respective labour market positions were. Regarding the labour market position after a change, 
individuals can choose from: other function with same employer, employee at other 
employer, self-employed, co-working partner of self-employed, no paid job but looking for 
one, no paid job and not looking for one, military service, and full-time education. From 
these labour market histories we obtain the sequence of labour market states occupied and the 
sojourn times in these states. People are defined to be unemployed when they do not have a 
job but are looking for one. One does not need to receive unemployment benefits to be 
unemployed. 
We define regular work as being in a job that is a permanent job or being in a job 
with a limited-term contract that is supposed to become permanent. In the Netherlands, 
starting on a one-year contract in a job is very common, and practically everybody gets a 
subsequent offer of a permanent contract for the same job. These one-year contract jobs are 
not the temporary jobs we are interested in here, since these are by definition a starting point 
for regular employment. Instead, we define temporary jobs as the more contingent types of 
jobs: fixed-term jobs, temporary agency work, on-call contracts and subsidised temporary 
jobs. It should be noted that in the Netherlands, contrary to certain other countries, 
unemployed individuals who are registered at commercial temporary work agencies but are 
currently not assigned to an employer, do not receive wage income and are considered to be 
unemployed. This also applies to our data. 
Concerning the employment positions at the survey moments we observe the wage, 
number of hours worked, industry, occupation, type of work, type of contract, etcetera. For 
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periods between survey moments we have less information, and this leads to two problems. 
First, we do not observe many characteristics of jobs that start and end between two 
consecutive interviews. Notably, we often do not observe the wage of such jobs. This implies 
that the set of explanatory variables that we can use is mostly restricted to background 
characteristics of the individual (listed below). Secondly, it is not always clear whether a job 
that starts and ends between two consecutive interviews is temporary or not. If case of doubt 
we infer the type of contract from other variables. We use the stated channel by which the job 
was found – this can be a temporary help agency – and the stated reason why transitions into 
and out of the job are made – to get more job security or because of the end of contract, 
respectively. In some cases these variables are missing, and we right-censor the 
unemployment spell at the moment of the transition into such a job. The latter occurred in 
12% of all spells.  
We can then measure the duration between the start of unemployment and the 
moment at which the individual moves into either regular or temporary work. Subsequently, 
we can measure the duration from the start of a temporary job until the moment at which the 
individual moves to a regular job. The latter duration period may include intermittent 
temporary jobs and periods of unemployment in between. All these durations may be right-
censored due to a transition to another labour market state, or due to reaching the end of the 
observation window. 
We do not include unemployment spells that started before the first interview, so that 
there are no initial conditions problems. The indicated selection results in a sample of 976 
individuals. All individuals have become unemployed at least once during the time period 
1988-2000. We use up to three spells of unemployment per individual. This results in 1175 
spells. 
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Table 1.  Labour market transitions in our subsample, 1988-2000 (percentages). 
  Labour force status survey year t+2 
Labour force status 
survey year t 
Out of the 
labour force 
Unemployment# Temporary 
employment 
Regular 
employment 
Out of the labour force 58% 26% 7% 9% 
Unemployment 22% 32% 16% 30% 
Temporary employment 6% 21% 35% 38% 
Regular employment 3% 18% 8% 71% 
#  Transitions to unemployment are relatively frequent in our sample since we select only those who are 
observed to become unemployed at least once. 
 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the labour market positions of 
individuals at interview dates. E.g. 16 percent of the unemployed are in temporary 
employment two years later. These numbers are roughly consistent with earlier findings both 
in the Netherlands and other Western countries (e.g. Dekker and Kaiser, 2000; Segal and 
Sullivan, 1997). Transitions from temporary jobs to regular work are frequent, and, indeed, 
more frequent than transitions from unemployment to regular work. This suggests that 
temporary employment might serve as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Figure 1 
shows the total number of observed labour market transitions in our subsample. Note that 
some types of transitions do not play a role in the empirical analysis below, in particular the 
transitions to and from ‘not in the labour force’, the transitions to unemployment, and the 
transitions from regular (or permanent) employment to temporary employment.  
A number of individual characteristics is recorded at the first interview, and an 
attempt is made to keep track of changes in time-varying characteristics such as family 
composition, marital status and level of education. These characteristics are used as 
explanatory variables. Appendix 1 gives some sample averages. Information on the labour 
market tightness, notably the unemployment/vacancy ratios per education level, is gathered 
from Netherlands Statistics (CBS). 
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Figure 1.  Labour market transitions in the data set  
 
 
3.  The model specification 
 
3.1. The transition rates 
 
In the introduction of the paper we mentioned the distinguishing features of the ‘timing of 
events’ methodology that we apply. We adopt the model framework of Van den Berg, Holm 
and Van Ours (2002), which was constructed to study the existence of stepping-stone jobs in 
the Dutch medical profession. In our context, the model specifies the transition rates from 
unemployment to temporary employment and to regular employment, and from temporary 
employment to regular employment. In general, the transition rate or hazard rate θBijB is defined 
as the rate at which an individual flows from one state i to another state j, given that (s)he 
survived in state i until the current moment. We define the indices i and j to have values: 1 = 
unemployment, 2 = temporary employment, and 3 = regular employment. We specify a 
mixed proportional hazard model for each transition rate. Let observed characteristics be 
denoted by x BijB and the baseline hazard by λ BijB(.), for the transition rate from state i to state j. In 
addition, β BijB is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The multiplicative random effects v BijB 
are state and exit destination specific. Then, 
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Note that we implicitly imposed that the hazard rates only depend on the elapsed duration in 
the current state and not on earlier outcomes.  
We now define a spell to be the time span between entry into unemployment and 
entry into regular work. For a given individual, the values of v BijB are assumed to be identical 
across different spells. To deal with selective inflow into temporary work and permanent 
work, we allow the v BijB to be related for a given individual. For example, the observed 
transition rate from temporary work to regular work may be higher than the observed rate 
from unemployment to regular work just because individuals for whom it is easy to find 
regular work tend to self-select into temporary work. Then v B12 B is positively related to v B13 Band 
v B23 B. It is also possible that persons who most easily find regular work find less easily a 
temporary job, which means that v B12 B and v B13 B are negatively related.  
The individual likelihood contribution of this model is unconditional on the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms v (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990). With unobserved heterogeneity, 
the likelihood function is not separable in the parameters of different transition rates. Abbring 
and Van den Berg (2003) analyse the identification of these types of models. It turns out that 
the availability of multiple spell data is useful in the sense that fewer assumptions are needed 
for identification, and therefore the empirical results are less sensitive to aspects of the model 
specification. See also Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) for comparisons to inference with 
latent variable methods and panel data methods. 
An important condition for identification concerns the absence of anticipation of the 
moment of treatment. This basically means that the individual should not know more about 
the moment of treatment than is captured by the modelled distribution of the duration until 
treatment. In our context, anticipation occurs for example if the individual stops looking for 
regular work (or actually has an increased transition rate into regular work) upon the moment 
it is decided that he will enter a temporary job in a certain time period from now. If the 
researcher does not observe the moment of this decision then the estimates of current 
transition rates are determined by future events. However, such a scenario seems unlikely in 
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the present setup, and indeed one may argue that the “no anticipation” assumption is in line 
with the flexible nature of temporary work. The matching of employers and employees is a 
random process, and temporary workers are often called at short notice. Against this one may 
argue that some individuals are registered at temporary work agencies as looking for such 
jobs, but that this is unobserved, and that these individuals may have a higher rate of moving 
from unemployment to temporary work. However, this is captured as unobserved 
heterogeneity. Also, the data contain an explanatory variable indicating whether the 
individual, when unemployed, prefers temporary work to regular work. 
 
3.2.  Parameterisation and quantities of interest 
 
We follow the literature by taking the duration dependence functions (or baseline hazards) 
λ BijB(t) to have piecewise constant specifications. We subdivide a duration axis into a finite 
number of intervals numbered 1,2,… from the origin onwards. Let t denote the elapsed 
duration, τ refer to the successive intervals and I Bτ B(t) denote time-varying dummy variables 
that are equal to 1 iff t is in the interval τ. The piecewise constant duration dependence 
function can then be written as 
∑
=
=
,...2,1
)()(log
τ
ττλλ tIt ijij  
With an increasing number of time intervals, any duration dependence pattern can be 
approximated arbitrarily closely. We use 8 intervals. This captures the empirical shapes well. 
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term v to be multivariate 
discrete with a finite number of mass points, and we take the locations of the mass points as 
well as the associated probabilities to be unknown parameters. Each individual has a unique 
set of v B12 B,v B13 B,v B23 B. We allow for N different types of individuals, where a type is characterized 
by a unique set of values of v B12 B,v B13 B,v B23 B. Let pBn B with n=1,2,…,N denote probabilities that add to 
1, and let v Bijn B denote a realization of the random variable v BijB. Following the specifications of 
the distribution G of v in Card and Sullivan (1988) and Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours 
(2002), we impose that  
nijnij pvv == )Pr(    for all }23,13,12{∈ij  
and njijiijnij vvvv **** =⇔=   for all }23,13,12{, ** ∈jiij  
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The resulting family of distributions of v is a special case of the general multivariate 
discrete distribution. The latter has N possible realisations of each v BijB, and every combination 
of realisations of v BijB and v Bi*j* B is allowed, so that the vector v has NP3 Ppossible realisations. This 
amounts to NP3P+3N-1 unknown parameters, which, in the light of the large number of 
parameters elsewhere in the model, is less feasible even for N=2. Our specification of the 
distribution of v restricts the general multivariate distribution by imposing some structure on 
the relation between the elements of v B12 B,v B13 B,v B23 B, and indeed it has only 4N-1 unknown 
parameters. Note that since we also allow for constant terms in the vectors of regression 
coefficients, not all of these parameters are identified. Hence, we normalise the mean of 
(v B12 B,v B13 B,v B23 B) to be 1. This reduces the number of estimated parameters for the distribution of v 
by three.TP4 PT Note that the relation between the elements of v B12 B,v B13 B,v B23 B is not imposed to be 
monotone. As noted above, the extent to which v B12 Bis related to v B13 B and v B23 Bdetermines the 
extent to which selectivity affects the relation in the raw data between having temporary 
work or not on the one hand, and the rate of entering regular work on the other hand. In the 
empirical analysis, we report standard errors for the estimates conditional on the value of N.  
We now examine which model quantities are informative on the treatmentTP5 PT or 
stepping-stone effect. The discussion is informal and suppresses notation in terms of 
counterfactual outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003). For expositional reasons we 
briefly resort to an extension of the above model framework, allowing θB23 B to depend on the 
time since entry into unemployment (say, τ) as well as on the time t since entry into 
temporary work. Consider an individual who became unemployed at time zero. The 
treatment effect of having moved into temporary work at a given time t BUEB on the individual 
transition rate into regular work at a time t>t BUEB, compared to not having entered temporary 
work until and including t, equals θB23 B(t,τ|x,v B23 B)/θB13 B(τ|x,v B13 B)-1. Note that τ=t+t BUEB. This 
treatment effect is not represented by a single model parameter, even if v B13 B=v B23 B.TP6 PT To see this, 
                                                          
TP
4
PT Clearly, if we would divide the states of unemployment and/or temporary employment into a number of sub-
states then the number of parameters would become too large to be able to estimate the model. 
 
TP
5
PT The present use of the term “treatment” is somewhat out of line with the common use, because the move into a 
temporary job is to a large extent driven by the behaviour of the individual under consideration. 
 
TP
6
PT The fact that we allow βB13B to be different from βB23 B and that we allow vB13 B/vB23B to be different across individuals 
means that we allow the individual effects of temporary work to differ between individuals. The average effects 
can then be obtained by averaging the individual effect over x and v.  
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note that a zero treatment effect can only be attained if there is no duration dependence in the 
transition rate from temporary work to regular work, because otherwise the numerator varies 
over t whereas the denominator cannot. In other words, if there is such duration dependence 
then there will be a treatment effect for at least some t. Ruling out such duration dependence 
would be absurd in the light of the fact that temporary jobs may involve a lock-in effect, 
causing the transition rate into regular work to be lower right after having entered a 
temporary job and higher some time later. Indeed, the absence of duration dependence is 
violated by the data. Also, it would be absurd to let the time variation in the transition rate 
from temporary to regular work be functionally related to the time variation in the transition 
rate from unemployment to regular work at the same point of time in the counterfactual case. 
In our actual parameterisation, the transition rate from temporary work to regular work 
depends on the time since entry into temporary work, whereas the rate from unemployment 
into regular work depends on the time since entry into unemployment. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the results indicate a treatment effect on the transition rate into regular work.  
Of course it is still interesting to examine the duration dependence patterns and 
average levels of the transition rates into regular work. For example, if for an individual with 
given values of x and v it always holds that θB23 B(t|x,v B23 B)>θB13 B(τ|x,v B13 B), then the individual 
treatment effect is positive at all points of time. However, given the complexity of the model, 
a quantitative assessment of the over-all effect of temporary work is more easily studied with 
an outcome measure that aggregates over effects on instantaneous transition rates. For this 
purpose we use the cumulative probability of moving into a regular job, at various points of 
time after entry into unemployment. We quantify these probabilities, as well as the effect of 
temporary work on them, by using the estimated model. First, it is not difficult to show that 
the cumulative probability of moving into regular work within t periods after having entered 
unemployment equals  
∫ −−+
t
dtSSSSS
0
23131212121313 ))(1()()()()()()( τττττθτττθ          (1) 
where the indices of S refer to the corresponding duration variable (i.e. SB12 B is the survivor 
function of the duration from unemployment into temporary work, which is a latent variable). 
The first part of the expression equals the probability of moving into regular work by way of 
 13
a direct transition from unemployment, whereas the second part equals the probability of 
moving into regular work by way of temporary work. Logically, the probability of moving 
into regular work directly from unemployment does not converge to 1 as t goes to infinity. 
The relevant population estimate of (1) follows by integration of the total expression over the 
distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics.  
The decomposition of (1) into its two terms does not capture a treatment effect. To see 
this, note that both terms are positive even if there is no individual treatment effect, i.e. if the 
states of unemployment and temporary work are equivalent in the sense that the transition 
rate from temporary work to regular work at any calendar time point equals the transition rate 
from unemployment to regular work that would have prevailed at that point. One can define a 
sensible treatment effect by comparing the actual magnitude of expression (1) to the 
magnitude in a situation where the two transition rates into regular work are equal at any 
point of time. However, as we have just seen, the latter is not covered by the model 
parameterisation. Fortunately, there is an equivalent way to quantify the probability of 
moving into regular work within t periods in the absence of a treatment effect: simply impose 
in (1) that the transition rate into temporary work θB12 B equals zero. This holds for the general 
model parameterisation where θB23 B is also allowed to depend on the time τ since entry into 
unemployment, as well as for our actual parameterisation. In Appendix 2 we demonstrate this 
formally.  
Some comments are in order. First, in the absence of temporary work, some of the 
individuals who would otherwise have moved into regular work by way of a temporary job 
move into regular work directly from unemployment. Therefore, the cumulative fraction of 
individuals moving into regular work exceeds the observed fraction of individuals who move 
directly from unemployment into regular work. This counterfactual cumulative probability 
converges to 1 as t goes to infinity. Secondly, all these calculations assume that the absence 
of temporary jobs does not affect the magnitude of the direct transition rate from 
unemployment to regular work (recall the discussion in Section 1). There are many reasons 
why this assumption may be incorrect. Notably, there may be equilibrium effects on the 
demand and supply of regular jobs, and individuals may increase their search intensity for 
regular work. 
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Thirdly, it is not possible to nonparametrically test whether the curve described by (1) 
is different from the curve obtained by imposing θB12 B=0. Of course, the curve described by (1) 
can be estimated nonparametrically, using the Kaplan-Meier estimator to deal with right 
censoring at the end of the observation window. However, the curve obtained by imposing 
θB12 B=0 is counterfactual. It cannot be estimated from durations until transitions from 
unemployment into regular work, because these are right-censored by actual transitions into 
temporary work, and such censoring times are dependent because they depend on unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
4.1. Stepping-stone effect 
 
We start with the estimates of the shapes of the individual transition rates as functions of the 
elapsed durations in the states under consideration. Given the initial level of a transition rate 
(i.e., upon entry into the state under consideration), the shape of this rate is described by the 
parameters of the duration dependence function (see the estimates in Table 2a). Figure 2 
plots the individual transition rates as functions of the elapsed duration in the present state for 
an individual with average observed (x) and unobserved characteristics (v), using the 
estimated model. Tables 2b and 2c present the parameter estimates of the covariate effects 
and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution; these are discussed in detail later in this 
section. These curves are informative on the individual treatment effect for the average 
individual.  
Evidently, from unemployment, the rate into temporary work is much smaller than 
the rate into regular work. However, once in temporary employment, the rate of flowing into 
regular work is larger than otherwise. This demonstrates the presence of a stepping-stone 
effect. One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly 
attached to that job, for example for contractual reasons. In some sense this is true: the 
transition from temporary into regular employment substantially increases after a period of 
one year.  However, even newly employed temporary workers have a higher rate into regular 
work than unemployed workers. The treatment effect is unambiguously (and significantly) 
positive, regardless of the durations at which it is evaluated. 
 
Table 2a. Estimation results for the log duration dependence functions.  
 Unempl to temp Unempl to regular Temp to regular 
3 – 6 months 0.070 (0.157) 0.307 (0.119) 0.561 (0.236) 
7 – 12 months 0.023 (0.164) 0.084 (0.131) 0.472 (0.228) 
13 – 18 months -0.409 (0.191) -0.117 (0.146) 0.732 (0.226) 
19 – 24 months 0.332 (0.205) -0.222 (0.152) 1.300 (0.260) 
25 – 36 months 0.400 (0.233) 0.256 (0.149) 1.610 (0.243) 
37 – 48 months 0.059 (0.329) -0.230 (0.185) 1.789 (0.259) 
> 48 months 0.319 (0.378) -0.007 (0.285) 1.166 (0.339) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated transition rates for the average individual. 
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Since the transition rate from temporary work to regular work increases during the 
temporary job, the accumulation of human capital may be a major reason for employers to 
prefer individuals who have occupied a temporary job. An increasing size of the social 
network among employed workers may also explain this. Apparently, for prospective 
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employers, being in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has 
been found acceptable for such a job. Of course, all transition rates are affected by conditions 
in the labour market and by the behaviour of the individual and prospective employers, and 
we should emphasise that in this paper we do not aim to formally estimate an economic 
model that distinguishes between the roles of these factors. 
Note that the estimation results discussed above are not due to selection effects, 
because we corrected for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Estimates of a model 
without unobserved heterogeneity show a much larger stepping-stone effect. This indicates a 
strong selection over the direct and indirect routes.  
 
Figure 3. Estimated probability of moving to regular work, directly or through temporary 
work. 
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We now turn to the quantification of the over-all effect of temporary work on the 
cumulative probability of moving into regular work. The solid curve in Figure 3 displays the 
latter probability as a function of the time since entry into unemployment. This is obtained by 
using the estimated model to calculate expression (1) for each individual in the sample and 
for all possible combinations of vij’s, and subsequently taking weighted averages, so the 
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curves in Figure 3 estimate population fractions. Similarly, the dashed curve visualises the 
probability of moving into regular work without an intermediate spell of temporary work, 
applying the decomposition of expression (1). The difference between the curves estimates 
the actual probability of moving to regular work by way of temporary work. After 6 months, 
11 percent of the flow into regular work consists of transitions through temporary work, 
while after 72 months this percentage has increased to 36.  
The dashed curve in Figure 4 plots the estimated counterfactual probability of moving 
into regular work if there is no temporary employment. This is obtained by imposing in 
expression (1) that the transition rate into temporary work equals zero, taking again averages 
across individuals in the sample and across the vij’s. For comparison, the solid curve of 
Figure 3 is repeated in Figure 4. In the absence of temporary jobs, only 55 percent (instead of 
83 percent) move into regular work within five years after entry into unemployment. This 
shows that the stepping-stone effect is dramatically large.  
 
Figure 4. Estimated probability of moving to regular work, with and without stepping-stone 
effect. 
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Note that the dashed curve in Figure 4 is only marginally higher than the dashed line 
in Figure 3. This reflects the fact that the transition rate into temporary work is much lower 
than the transition rate from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary 
work channel does not affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive 
substitution towards the direct channel into regular work. However, in the presence of 
temporary work, the individuals who manage to move into temporary work face a very high 
transition rate into regular work, so that shutting down the temporary work channel implies a 
much lower over-all probability of moving into regular work. In sum, not many individuals 
move into temporary work, but those who do benefit enormously from it. In the next 
subsections we examine whether this result is an average result or whether it is uniformly 
valid for all types of individuals.7
 
4.2. Covariate effects 
 
Table 2b presents the covariate effects on the individual transition rates.8 Note that a positive 
sign indicates a shorter duration. The comparison of the coefficients for “unemployment to 
regular” to the coefficients for “temporary to regular” is informative on the variation of the 
stepping-stone effect across different types of individuals. Given the presence of a stepping-
stone effect, the comparison of the coefficients for “unemployment to regular” to 
“unemployment to temporary” is informative on the relevance of this effect for obtaining 
regular work. Before making these comparisons, we first discuss the coefficients themselves. 
                                                          
7 Some recent studies consider the effect of temporary work on long run employment outcomes using models 
without potentially selective unobserved heterogeneity (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, and Hagen, 2003). Hagen 
found a stepping-stone effect of temporary work in Germany, Amuedo Dorantes found none for Spain. 
Gagliarducci (2004) considers the effect of the number of temporary jobs, taking selection effects into account. 
 
8 There are no observed transitions from temporary work to regular work by women with a non-working 
partner. 
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Table 2b. Estimation results of covariate effects  
 Unemployment 
to regular 
Unemployment 
to temporary 
Temporary 
to regular 
Age/10 -0.432 ** 
(0.063) 
-0.208 ** 
(0.083) 
-0.208 ** 
(0.093) 
Female -0.218 
(0.135) 
-0.036 
(0.156) 
-0.088 
(0.193) 
Ethnic minority -0.092  
(0.072) 
-1.477 ** 
(0.102) 
1.022  
(0.823) 
Education: 
   Low 
 
   High 
 
-0.206 
(0.106) 
0.198 ** 
(0.094) 
 
-0.180 
(0.135) 
-0.149 
(0.099) 
 
0.066 
(0.151) 
-0.132 * 
(0.079) 
Region (Randstad is default) 
   West  
 
   North 
 
   East 
 
   South 
 
0.245 * 
(0.145) 
-0.516 ** 
(0.177) 
0.144 
(0.150) 
0.094 
(0.144) 
 
1.267 ** 
(0.265) 
0.512 * 
(0.296) 
0.838 ** 
(0.272) 
0.970 ** 
(0.258) 
 
0.623 ** 
(0.207) 
0.632 * 
(0.330) 
0.352 
(0.257) 
0.109 
(0.209) 
Children 
   Man with children at home 
 
   Woman with children at home 
 
-0.213 * 
(0.131) 
-0.252  
(0.173) 
 
0.531 ** 
(0.179) 
-0.444 ** 
(0.179) 
 
1.365 ** 
(0.278) 
-0.233  
(0.161) 
Partner 
   Man with working partner 
 
   Woman with working partner 
 
   Man with non-working partner 
 
   Woman with non-working partner 
 
1.186 ** 
(0.121) 
0.817 ** 
(0.138) 
0.720 ** 
(0.111) 
0.437 ** 
(0.155) 
 
-0.482 ** 
(0.180) 
0.373 ** 
(0.188) 
-0.597 ** 
(0.160) 
-0.025 
(0.270) 
 
-1.275 ** 
(0.269) 
0.152 
(0.139) 
-1.533 ** 
(0.369) 
 
Vacancy to unemployment ratio 1.375 ** 
(0.170) 
-0.130 
(0.199) 
0.972 ** 
(0.239) 
Desired number of working hours per week 0.178 ** 
(0.065) 
0.249 ** 
(0.080) 
0.252 ** 
(0.118) 
Temporary job preferred to regular job at start of 
unemployment 
-0.467 ** 
(0.169) 
-0.048 
(0.212) 
0.972 ** 
(0.253) 
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates two-sided significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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The transition rates into regular work are higher in labour markets with many 
vacancies per unemployed individual. This is generally found in the literature. However, it 
does not hold for the rate into temporary work. Apparently, this rate is less sensitive to 
business cycle fluctuations. Bover and Gomez (1999) found this effect for Spain as well. The 
results also show that in general it is easier to become employed if one wants to work more 
hours. Older unemployed individuals need more time to move into regular and temporary 
positions. Individuals searching for part-time work have lower transition rates both into 
regular and temporary work.  
Having a partner has a strong positive effect on the direct transition from 
unemployment to regular work. This effect is well known (for an overview of studies on this 
issue, see Ginter and Zavodny, 2001). There is no generally accepted reason for this 
phenomenon. Partners may make individuals more productive and therefore more attractive 
to employers. Alternatively, individuals who are successful on the labour market may have 
characteristics that also make them attractive on the marriage market. The effect we find is 
larger for working partners than for non-working partners, which supports the selection 
hypothesis. However, men with a partner but without children have lower transition rates into 
temporary work, and this suggests that such men simply focus their search effort on regular 
work. Women with a working partner and women without children have higher transition 
rates into temporary work. Women with a working partner are often not breadwinner and 
may therefore have a lower need for job security.  
Unemployed individuals who prefer temporary work to regular work do not make the 
direct transition from unemployment to a regular job often. However, they have a much 
higher probability of finding regular employment in succession to a temporary job. These 
individuals may have a particular reason to expect a temporary job to serve as a stepping-
stone. 
Men with children at home have a higher transition rate from temporary to regular 
work. These men may be under high pressure to provide a satisfactory level of family income 
and thus may be eager to transform their insecure temporary job into a more secure regular 
position. We also find a negative effect for men with a partner, perhaps indicating that having 
a partner reduces the urgency for provision of a satisfactory level of family income by the 
man alone. 
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What do the covariate effects imply for the magnitude of the stepping-stone effect for 
different types of individuals? From a policy point of view, it is particularly interesting to 
focus on disadvantaged groups, notably ethnic minorities and women. For example, ethnic 
minorities have unemployment rates that are more than twice as large as native Dutch 
individuals - in 2002 7.7 versus 3.3 percent. The stepping-stone effect may be larger for 
ethnic minorities if employers who are reluctant to hire ethnic minorities can screen them by 
way of a temporary contract. In that case, it makes sense to stimulate unemployed 
immigrants to register at temporary work agencies.  
Table 2b shows that the direct transition rate to regular work is lower for ethnic 
minorities, while the transition rate from temporary to regular employment is much higher 
for them. This indicates a stepping-stone effect that is much higher than average and much 
higher than for natives. Note that the standard errors are large, and the estimated coefficients 
are insignificant. This may reflect the small number of ethnic minorities in the sample. 
However, we do observe a significantly negative coefficient for the transition rate into 
temporary work. So, because ethnic minorities do not get temporary jobs very often, they do 
not benefit from any stepping-stone effect. As a result, the over-all probability of moving into 
regular work is substantially lower than for natives. Clearly, this supports policy measures 
that stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by helping them 
to register at temporary work agencies.  
Because of the interaction terms with gender in the parameterised model it is hard to 
draw conclusions on the difference between men and women from Table 2b. Therefore we 
resort to a graphical analysis analogous to Figures 3 and 4 above (see Figure 5, which is the 
analogue of Figure 3). There is little difference between men and women in the stepping-
stone effect of temporary jobs. Females have lower probabilities of finding regular jobs, but 
the effect of having a temporary job is about the same, and so is the use of the temporary 
work channel. 
Contrasting singles and individuals who live with a partner gives very pronounced 
differences in outcomes. As noted before, it is generally found in the literature that singles 
have a weaker labour market position, and this is reflected by the fact that they have a lower 
probability of moving directly into regular work. However, for singles the stepping-stone 
effect is much larger, and the probability that they benefit from it is also much larger, so that 
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as a result they often obtain regular work through temporary work. Apparently, the flexibility 
associated with being single goes well together with the flexibility associated with temporary 
work.  
 
Figure 5. Estimated probability of moving to regular work, directly or through temporary 
work, for men and women. 
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Another informative characteristic concerns whether the individual prefers temporary 
work over regular work upon entering unemployment. If the latter holds then it takes more 
time to move directly into regular work, but the stepping-stone effect is very large. This is 
plausible: such individuals are presumably aware of the size of the effect. 
In general, despite the variation in the magnitude of the effect across workers, the 
effect is positive for virtually all types of workers that we can distinguish on the basis of 
observed characteristics, including those with a relatively weak labour market position.  
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4.3.  Unobserved heterogeneity 
 
Table 2c presents the estimates of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution. In fact, these concern a slightly more general distribution than discussed in 
Section 3. In particular, we allow for realisations of all possible combinations of the value of 
the unobserved heterogeneity term in the transition rate from unemployment to regular work 
on the one hand, and the values of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the other transition 
rates on the other. This results in four types of individual values of the vector of unobserved 
heterogeneity terms (see Table 2c). Only two groups have a substantial size, and if we 
remove the negligible Types 1 and 4 we again obtain the specification that we discussed in 
Section 3.  
 
Table 2c. Estimation results for unobserved heterogeneity 
 Unemployment to 
regular (i=1, j=3) 
Unemployment to 
temporary (i=1, j=2) 
Temporary to 
regular (i=2, j=3) 
Constants 
   vij1 
 
   vij2 
 
 
-4.665 ** 
 (0.522) 
-0.761 ** 
             (0.379) 
 
         -6.787 ** 
         (0.693) 
         -1.632 ** 
(0.489) 
 
-2.183 ** 
(0.792) 
-3.658 ** 
(1.100) 
Probability 
   Pr(v12= v121;  v13= v131;  v23= v231 ), Type 1 
 
   Pr(v12= v122;  v13= v131;  v23= v231 ), Type 2 
 
   Pr(v12= v121;  v13= v132;  v23= v232 ), Type 3 
 
   Pr(v12= v122;  v13= v132;  v23= v232 ), Type 4 
 
  
0.000009 
(0.000012) 
0.382 
(0.367) 
0.617 * 
(0.367) 
0.000083 * 
(0.000050) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates two-sided significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level. 
 
 As always in models with unobserved heterogeneity, the heterogeneity distribution 
estimates are difficult to interpret. First, they are determined by the set of included 
covariates. Secondly, the discrete heterogeneity distribution should be interpreted as an 
approximation of the true distribution. Keeping this in mind, note that Type 2 individuals 
have a low probability to find regular work directly from unemployment but a high 
probability to find temporary work, whereas for Type 3 it is the other way around. Type 2 
individuals have a high stepping-stone effect. For Type 3 individuals v23<v13. As a result the 
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stepping-stone effect, which we concluded to exist in general, might be absent for this group. 
The net effect depends on the elapsed durations and covariates at hand. The variances and 
correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are all significantly different from zero. 
This implies that a model that does not take the selection into temporary work into account is 
misspecified and leads to incorrect inference on the stepping-stone effect. 
 In general, the main results are robust with respect to a range of model specification 
features like the set of included covariates, the duration dependence intervals, and the 
numbers of mass points of the heterogeneity distribution.  
 
4.4.  Quality of jobs found 
 
A limitation of analyses of treatment effects on unemployment durations is that they typically 
ignore effects on the type and quality of the accepted job. Unfortunately, our data do not 
allow us to address this issue in detail either, since the wages that are earned, the hours 
worked, and the fringe benefits are not observed. The dataset only supplies job characteristics 
at survey dates of jobs held at survey dates, but it does not supply job characteristics at the 
moment of job acceptance, and it does not supply characteristics of jobs held in between 
survey dates. However, the data allow us to address the stability of the jobs. Ideally, this 
would have to be included in the duration model above. But our number of observations is 
limited, and inclusion of two other transitions, from temporary jobs to unemployment and 
from regular jobs to unemployment, is unfeasible. For this reason, we simply estimate 
duration models for the duration of the regular job, where the way it is found - directly or by 
way of temporary employment - is used as an explanatory variable (see Appendix 3).  
The results indicate that the duration of the regular job does not depend on whether it 
is directly preceded by a temporary job or by unemployment. Simple t-tests also show that 
the reason why people separate from the regular job does not differ significantly between 
directly and indirectly found regular jobs. Regarding the exit state we do see a slight 
difference: jobs found by way of temporary employment end less often in unemployment and 
more often into a transition to another temporary job. However, this difference is not 
statistically significant. Together, this does not suggest that the jobs found by way of 
temporary work are very different from those found directly from unemployment. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Temporary work serves as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Having obtained a 
temporary job means that the transition rate into regular work is higher than in 
unemployment. The effect is positive regardless of the durations at which it is evaluated. It 
increases in the time since flowing into temporary work, suggesting that being in a temporary 
job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has been found acceptable for such 
a job. All these results are obtained while correcting for selection effects associated with 
moving into temporary work. 
The transition rate into temporary work is substantially lower than the transition rate 
from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary work channel does not 
affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive substitution towards the direct 
channel into regular work. However, those individuals who manage to move into temporary 
work face a very high subsequent transition rate into regular work. In sum, not many 
individuals move into temporary work, but those who do benefit enormously from it. As a 
result, the over-all probability of moving into regular work within say five years after entry 
into unemployment is substantially increased by the presence of temporary work.  
The above effects are positive for virtually all workers, including workers with a 
relatively weak labour market position. Ethnic minorities have a high stepping-stone effect 
on the transition rate to regular work but they rarely flow into temporary jobs, so they do not 
benefit from the effect. This suggests that policy measures should be taken to stimulate the 
use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by helping them to register at 
temporary work agencies.  
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Appendix 1. Sample statistics of explanatory variables 
Table A1. Sample averages of explanatory variables  
variable average 
Age (at start unemployment)    33  
Female 0.56 
Ethnic minority 0.04 
Education: 
   Low 
   Medium 
   High 
 
0.32 
0.55 
0.13 
Region: 
   Randstad 
   West 
   North 
   East 
   South 
 
0.19 
0.24 
0.13 
0.20 
0.24 
Children: 
   No children at home 
   Man with children at home 
   Woman with children at home 
 
0.57 
0.15 
0.27 
Partner:  
   Single 
   Man with working partner 
   Woman with working partner 
   Man with non-working partner 
   Woman with non-working partner 
 
0.46 
0.12 
0.29 
0.11 
0.05 
Desired number of working hours    32 
Temp job preferred (at start unemployment) 0.07 
Vacancies/Unemployment ratio 0.19 
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Appendix 2. The treatment effect on the probability of moving into regular work 
Consider the model extension where θB23 B depends on the time t since entry into temporary 
work as well as on the current time τ=t+t BUEB since entry into unemployment, where t BUEB 
denotes the moment of the transition into temporary work, so θB23 B:=θB23 B(t,τ). We define 
SB23 B(t,t BUEB) as the survival function of the duration in temporary work if the transition into in 
temporary work occurs at t BUEB, so  
)),(exp(),(
0
2323 dzztzttS UE
t
UE +−= ∫θ  
We have to modify expression (1) accordingly, to 
∫ −−+
t
dtSSSSS
0
23131212121313 )),(1()()()()()()( ττττττθτττθ   (2) 
Absence of treatment effects means that for all t and τ there holds that θB23 B(t,τ)=θB13 B(τ). This 
implies that SB23 B(t-τ,τ)= SB13 B(t)/SB13 B(τ). If we substitute this into expression (2) and elaborate on 
this then we simply obtain SB13 B(t). The latter is also obtained if we substitute into (2) that 
θB12 B=0. (Notice that the first parts of expressions (1) and (2) do not change when imposing 
that for all t and τ there holds that θB23 B(t,τ)=θB13 B(τ).) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Analysis of the quality of the regular job 
Table A2. Duration analysis of regular jobs. 
 Weibull  Exponential  
 estimate standard 
error 
estimate standard 
error 
Intercept 3.842 0.307 3.788 0.279 
Female -0.216 0.256 0.223 0.234 
Ethnic minority 0.277 0.515 0.255 0.470 
Job found indirectly 0.1946 0.181 0.173 0.165 
Education 
   Low 
   High 
 
0.372 * 
0.310 
 
0.171 
0.219 
 
0.363 * 
0.314 
 
0.156 
0.200 
Region 
   West 
   North 
   East 
   South 
 
-0.599 * 
-0.621 
-0.495 
-0.292 
 
0.295 
0.337 
0.296 
0.289 
 
-0.546 * 
-0.568 
-0.445 
0.239 
 
0.270 
0.306 
0.269 
0.262 
Re-entrant 0.200 0.310 0.193 0.282 
Children at home 
   Man with children at home 
   Woman with children at home 
 
0.109 
0.589 * 
 
0.291 
0.236 
 
0.111 
0.562 * 
 
0.266 
0.216 
Working partner 
   Man with working partner 
   Woman with working partner 
   Man with non-working partner 
   Woman with non-working partner 
 
0.309 
-0.096 
0.307 
-0.117 
 
0.328 
0.420 
0.290 
0.251 
 
0.289 
-0.103 
0.278 
-0.094 
 
0.299 
0.382 
0.264 
0.228 
Log Likelihood -563.54  -565.26  
* significant at 5%-level 
 
destination Regular job found by way of 
temporary job 
Regular job found directly from 
unemployment 
Other regular job 67% 67% 
Temporary job 23% 15% 
Unemployed 4% * 12% * 
Out of the labour force 4% 3% 
Unknown 2% 4% 
* difference significant at 5%-level 
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